This paper investigates the dynamic consistency of Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences. A decision-maker is faced with an information structure represented by a fixed filtration. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be additive over the final stage in the filtration. D
Introduction
This paper finds necessary and sufficient conditions for dynamic consistency of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. Schmeidler (1989) proposed Choquet Expected Utility (henceforth CEU) as a theory of choice under ambiguity. However, it also has other applications, for instance, Wu (1999) has used it to model anxiety. Schmeidler's theory did not involve time. To make it more generally applicable, it is desirable to extend it to an intertemporal model. Multi-period decisions present new problems. Firstly, individuals will receive information as time progresses. It is necessary to model how they update their beliefs as this information is received. Secondly, it is not clear whether individuals with non-additive beliefs will be dynamically consistent. We consider all updating rules which satisfy a property which we consider to be reasonable.
In the works of Epstein and LeBreton (1993) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) , it is shown that, under some assumptions, dynamic consistency of CEU preferences implies that beliefs must be additive. However, these papers imposed conditions, which required consistency between different decision trees. In many economic problems, we only need to consider decision-making in a single tree, for instance, any model based on an extensive form game. Hence, it is not clear what implications the earlier results have in this context. Sarin and Wakker (1998) show that for a fixed decision tree, a necessary condition for dynamic consistency is that beliefs be additive except at the final stage. We provide a partial converse to their result by showing that if beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, this condition is also sufficient. In a recent paper, Hanany and Kilbanoff (2004) show, under alternative axioms, how dynamic consistency can be maintained in a fixed decision tree.
It has been argued that non-expected utility preferences are difficult to apply, since they may be dynamically inconsistent, see, for instance, Green (1987) or Hammond (1988) . We show that dynamic consistency does not imply beliefs should be additive, however, it does impose some restrictions. How acceptable these restrictions are would depend on the context.
CEU preferences and dynamic consistency
In this section, we introduce CEU preferences and find conditions for them to be dynamically consistent. We consider a finite set of states of nature S. The set of outcomes is a convex set X pR n . An act is a function from S to X. The set of all acts is denoted by A(S). In this paper, we shall restrict attention to the case where beliefs are represented by convex capacities.
Definition 2.1. A convex capacity on S is a real-valued function m on the subsets of S which satisfies the following properties: Schmeidler (1989) argues that convex capacities represent ambiguity-aversion. However alternative definitions of ambiguity-aversion due to Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) have cast doubt on the relationship between convexity and ambiguity-aversion.
If beliefs are represented by a capacity m on S, the expected utility of a given act can be found using the Choquet integral.
Notation 2.1. Since S is finite, one can order the utility from a given act a: u(a 1 )Nu(a 2 )N. . .Nu (a rÀ1 )Nu(a r ), where u(a 1 ),. . . u(a r ) are the possible utility levels yielded by action a. Denote by A k (a)={saS|u(a(s))[u(a k )} the set of states that yield a utility at least as high as a k . By convention, let A 0 (a)= F .
Definition 2.2. The Choquet expected utility of u with respect to capacity m is: Gilboa (1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992) provide axioms for representing preferences by a Choquet integral of utility. Another advantage of assuming convexity is that it implies that CEU preferences also have an intuitive multiple priors representation. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, m there exists a closed convex set C of probability distributions on S, such that:
R u(a(s))dm(s)=min paC E p u(a). 1 In addition, we shall assume that the utility function is continuous.
Assumption 2.1. The utility function u: X YR is continuous.
This says that no state is null in the sense that increasing the utility in any state will lead to a strictly preferred option. 2 To apply CEU in an intertemporal context, it is necessary to specify how beliefs will be updated as new information is received. There have been a number of proposals for updating CEU preferences, see, for instance, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) . Instead of focusing on a specific rule, we prove results for any updating procedure which satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2.3. Let m be a convex capacity on S and let E be an event. Then if m E denotes the update of m conditional on E, we assume that, m(E)+m(IE)=1 implies, m E (A)=m(A\E)/ m(E) for ApS.
The strongest motivation for studying Assumption 2.3 is that it is satisfied by the three commonest rules for updating CEU preferences, the Optimistic update, the Dempster-Shafer update, and the Generalised Bayesian Update, (defined below). Thus, using this assumption enables us to prove results for these three rules simultaneously. Assumption 2.3 was motivated by the desire to ensure that the updating rule agrees with Bayesian updating when there is no ambiguity. Since Bayesian updating is agreed to be correct for additive beliefs, it seems reasonable that an updating rule for nonadditive beliefs should have this property. If m(E)+m( IE)=1, Lemma 2.1 (below) implies that m(A)=m(A\E)+m(A\ IE). If E is observed m(A\ IE) is not relevant. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to take m(A\E) as a measure of the likelihood of A. Dividing by m(E) is a normalisation. The Dempster-Shafer update, see Shafer (1976) may be defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let m be a capacity on S. The Dempster-Shafer update (henceforth DSupdate) of m conditional on EpS is given by:
The DS-update has been axiomatised by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) , where it is shown to be equivalent to a maximum likelihood updating procedure. An alternative is the Optimistic update defined below.
Definition 2.4. Let m be a capacity on S. If E is observed and ApE, the Optimistic update of m conditional on E is given by:
This rule assumes that the worst possible outcome occurred on the complement of E, hence the term optimistic. The Generalised Bayesian Update (henceforth GBU) (see Jaffray, 1992; Fagin and Halpern, 1991; Walley, 1991) is defined as follows.
Definition 2.5. Let m be a capacity on S and let EpS. If E is observed and ApE, the GBU of r conditional on E is given by:
The GBU can be interpreted as the willingness to pay p for a lottery which pays 1 on A and 0 on E\A and is called off if IE occurs:
From the CEU of this lottery, m(A)(1Àp)+[1Àm( IE[A)] (Àp)=0, one can compute the price p as the likelihood of event A conditional on the event E obtaining.
The following lemma is provides a key step in the proof of the main result.
Lemma 2.1. Let e=E 1 ,N ,E K be a partition and let m be a convex capacity on S such that 
Next we shall find a necessary and sufficient condition for CEU preferences to be dynamically consistent. Let e=he 0 ,N ,e T i be a filtration. Let e T =hE 1 T ,. . .,
to be the set of acts available at time t, conditional on event E t being observed.
Assumption 2.4. We assume that the partition e T =hE 1 T ,. . .,
Definition 2.6. We denote CEU preferences conditional on E t ae t by v E t . They are defined by:
The individual has to choose an act from a set A(S) of acts available at t=0. At time t=s(s)he receives a signal, that tells him/her in which element of the partition Eae s the state of nature lies. Beliefs are then updated and the individual has an opportunity to reconsider his/her decision. If the signal says that the true state of nature is in Eae s then (s)he may choose any act from A(E).
The individual formulates a complete contingent plan of action at time t=0. After the receipt of new information, (s)he updates his/her beliefs. A new contingent plan is formulated for the remaining time periods. Acts are evaluated by a Choquet integral of utility with respect to the new beliefs. The individual is said to be dynamically consistent if (s)he keeps to his/her original plan. Below we formally define dynamic consistency with respect to a given filtration.
Definition 2.7. Preferences are said to be dynamically consistent with respect to a filtration e, if whenever sNt;
This definition says that if conditional on any piece of information which might be received, b is not preferred to a then b is initially not preferred to a.
The following lemma establishes that, when restricted to non-ambiguous events, any updating-rule satisfying Assumption 2.3 is independent of the order in which information is received.
Lemma 2.2. Let e=he 0 ,. . ., e T i be a filtration and let m be a capacity, such that 
Now we present our main result, which establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for CEU preferences to be dynamically consistent. Beliefs must be additive between different members of the finest partition in the filtration. They may however be nonadditive within a member of this partition.
Theorem 2.1. Let e=he 0 ,. . .,e T i be a given filtration on S; which satisfies Assumption 2.4.
If a decision-maker has CEU preferences with beliefs represented by a convex capacity, which satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and (s)he uses an updating rule which satisfies Assumption 2.3 then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. (s)he will be dynamically consistent with respect to e,
2.
P Eae T m E ð Þ ¼ 1.
Proof (1Z 2). Suppose that the decision-maker is dynamically consistent. Consider first the case K=2. Since the partition is non-trivial, we may find events, A, B, C, and D such that,
where A\B=C\D=F. Consider acts a, b, c, d, e and f as described in the following table:
We can ensure that acts with these values exist by appropriately normalising the utility function. Note that Padm E 1 =Pbdm E 1 , Pcdm E 1 =Pddm E 1 , Pedm E 1 =Pfdm E 1 ; Padm E 2 =Pcdm E 2 = Pedm E 2 and Pbdm E 2 =Pddm E 2 =Pfdm E 2 . By continuity and strong monotonicity, we may choose bN1 so that Padm E 2 =Pbdm E 2 . Dynamic consistency then implies that a~b, c~d and e~f. By evaluating the Choquet integrals, we find: 1=(bÀ1)m(C)+m(E 1 [C), m(E 2 )=bm(C) and bm(E 1 [C)=bm(E 1 )+1Àm(E 1 ). These equations imply m(E 1 )+m(E 2 )=1.
The general case can be established as follows. If P Eae T m E ð Þb1, then we can apply the above argument to F 1 =E 1 and F 2 ¼ [ Eae T ; EpE 1 to deduce that dynamic consistency implies m( F 1 )+m( F 2 )=1, which is a contradiction.
2Z 1 Now suppose that at time t event Ê is observed and at time sNt t; a+Ẽ Eb, for all Ẽ ae s , Ẽ pÊ . Let V(a|Ẽ )=Pu(a)dm Ẽ denote the (Choquet) expected utility of a conditional on Ẽ . By hypothesis and Assumption 2.3, mẼ E ðA i \Ẽ EÞ ¼
Now consider the decision at time t. By definition, the (Choquet) expected utility of any given act a is equal to V ajÊ E À Á
, since m is convex, it follows that m Ê is also convex. Lemma 2.1 implies that Eq. (1) may be rewritten as
:
A similar formula holds for the Choquet integral of b. Since for all Ẽ ae s , Ẽ pÊ , V(a|Ẽ )[V(b|Ẽ ), we have V(a|Ê )[V(b|Ê ) equivalently a+Ẽ E b, which establishes dynamic consistency. 5
Remark 1. The strategy of the proof of 1Z 2 is similar to that of Theorem 3.1 in Sarin and Wakker (1998) . Some of the assumptions may be relaxed slightly. The proof that 2Z 1 does not make use of the assumptions that utility is strongly monotonic or continuous. The proof that 1Z 2 does not use convexity.
Remark 2. From the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can see that Lemma 2.1, which requires beliefs to be represented by a convex capacity, is the most important step. The following example demonstrates that this result is no longer true if we do not assume convexity.
Example 2.1. Suppose there are two outcomes Win or Lose, where u(Win)=1N0=u(Lose). Consider a six element state space S={s 1 ,. . .,s 6 }. discussed in the present paper. Grant et al. (2000) found that additivity over the final partition was also sufficient for CEU preferences to be information-loving. Wu (1999) has shown that a plausible model of preferences concerning the resolution of uncertainty can lead to preferences of the CEU form.
